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RISK DYNAMICS AROUND RESTATEMENT
ANNOUNCEMENTS
May 9, 2019

Abstract:
We investigate the dynamic nature and temporal daily changes in systematic
(beta), as well as idiosyncratic and total risk around restatement announcements. We find
that beta increases by 51% at restatement announcement but it reverts to the prerestatement level within one month. However, idiosyncratic risk experiences a longerterm increase of approximately 20% following a restatement. Cross-sectional analysis
shows that the results are more pronounced for restatements associated with irregularity.
Overall, our findings suggest that risk components are time-varying with the systematic
component rapidly mean-reverting but the idiosyncratic component experiencing a
longer-term increase.

JEL classification: G14, G30, M41

Keywords: Disclosure, corporate misreporting, financial statement restatements, beta,
idiosyncratic risk, EGARCH, cost of capital
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1 Introduction
There is a common belief held by firm managers and regulators that higher
quality financial information is associated with lower cost of capital. Regulators such as
Arthur Levitt, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Neel
Foster, a former member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, stated that better
quality financial information reduces the cost of capital (Levitt 1998; Foster 2003;
Lambert et al. 2007). However, there is no consensus in either theoretical or empirical
literature regarding whether information risk is systematic or can be diversified away.
Moreover, models suggesting that information risk is priced do not agree whether the
effect should be concentrated at the time of disclosure or persist in the long-run. We
provide new evidence regarding the risk dynamics of firm equity in the context of
earnings restatements being a proxy for information risk. Our key finding is that
information risk leads to a significant increase in both beta and idiosyncratic risk at the
restatement announcement. However, the increase in beta is temporary and persists for
only one month, while the increase in idiosyncratic risk is longer-term.
There are several innovations in this paper. First, we examine time variation in
both systematic and idiosyncratic risk around restatement announcements. While
traditional asset pricing literature focuses mostly on systematic risk on the assumption
that it is the only type of risk that is priced, several recent papers suggest that
idiosyncratic risk may also be priced (Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003; Xu and Malkiel 2003;
and Merton (1987) to mention but a few). For example, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)
find that there is a tradeoff between risk and return in the stock market and that the risk is
measured as total risk, including idiosyncratic risk, rather than only systematic risk. They
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also find that idiosyncratic risk explains most of the variation of average stock risk
through time and it is idiosyncratic risk that drives the forecastability of the stock market.
Moreover, idiosyncratic risk is important for investors who are not well diversified, as
well as arbitrageurs and option traders, whose risk exposure depends on total volatility.
Increase in idiosyncratic risk also increases the cost of diversification for investors with
limited means (Xu and Malkiel 2003). Merton (1987) argues that idiosyncratic risk
should be priced if investors do not hold perfectly diversified portfolios. As such, cross
sectional stock returns should be positively related to idiosyncratic risk.
Second, we examine daily changes in the measures of risk using dynamic vector
EGARCH with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Consequently, our paper
is the first to isolate the short term effect of restatement announcement on both systematic
and idiosyncratic risk, as well as to examine the persistence of changes in these measures.
Another advantage of using our methodology is that, unlike commonly used stationary
CAPM type models, it accounts for conditional heteroscedasticity of stock returns. It is
well known that the returns on speculative assets in general, and stock returns in
particular, exhibit widely documented conditional heteroscedasticity, meaning that the
second moments and cross-moments are time-varying. Failing to account for such timedependencies when using stationary CAPM type model may lead to erroneous statistical
inference.
Our approach allows us to establish several new results. Our findings suggest that
idiosyncratic risk increases as early as six months leading up to restatement
announcement, spikes at the announcement, then decreases relative to announcement
level and remains at elevated levels relative to pre-restatement period for one year
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following the announcement. The increase in beta, however, is only temporary as it
experiences a significant increase at restatement announcement but returns to prerestatement level one month after restatement. Changes in measures of risk are both
economically and statistically significant. Beta risk increases 51% from 0.79 the day
before restatement to its highest level of 1.19 two days after restatement. Idiosyncratic
risk increases 30% in the same window. Relative to the base period, idiosyncratic risk
increases 46% at the restatement announcement (days 0; +5) and remains 21% higher
than the base level one year following a restatement.1
Overall, our findings suggest that systematic risk rises temporarily around
restatement day. More significantly, we provide new evidence that idiosyncratic risk
experiences a longer-term increase following restatement announcement. If idiosyncratic
risk is priced as is suggested by recent studies, then this result would indicate a long-term
increase in the cost of capital of restating firms due to increase in idiosyncratic risk but
not systematic risk. Our results are consistent with the notion that information risk has
greater importance for short-term traders, undiversified investors and investors in
derivative markets, than for long-term diversified investors. The former group of
investors will be affected both by the spike in idiosyncratic risk at the time of the
disclosure and by the long-term increase in idiosyncratic risk. Our study is the first to
examine the impact of information quality on idiosyncratic risk and the resulting
implications for the market participants.
Furthermore, we investigate whether there is cross-sectional variation in changes
in equity risk around restatements. We examine whether most of the increase in equity
risk is concentrated in restatements with irregularity. Such restatements contain more
1

Base period is defined as a period of six months ending 127 trading days prior to restatement.
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information and capture the effect of both poor quality financial information and the
effect of fraud, as well as expected litigation and regulatory costs. Restatements that do
not involve irregularity isolate the effect of poor quality financial information on risk. We
find a significant spike in all measures of risk for both sub-samples, with smaller spike
for no-irregularity sub-sample. Beta (idiosyncratic risk) increases by 89.9% (59.1%) for
irregularity and by 17.9% (16.7%) for no-irregularity sub-samples from day -1 to day +2
relative to restatement announcement. However, in cross-sectional analysis that controls
for firm size, the difference between the increase in beta at restatement announcement
relative to the base level for irregularity and no-irregularity sub-samples is not
statistically significant. This difference, however, is significant for idiosyncratic risk.
Restatements that involve irregularity are associated with a temporary increase in beta
and a long-term increase in idiosyncratic risk. The increase in both beta and idiosyncratic
risk is temporary for no-irregularity sub-sample.
Cross-sectional analysis further reveals that restatements of core accounts, such as
revenue and cost, result in a similar change in beta and idiosyncratic risk as the non-core
restatements at restatement announcement. However, core restatements have larger
increases in beta and idiosyncratic risk one year after restatement. All measures of risk
increase more at restatement announcement for restatements made by larger firms. We
find that it matters whether restatements are initiated by SEC, auditor or the company and
whether the restatement is made more than once by the same company. We also find that
there is a negative relation between the announcement period return and the idiosyncratic
risk, suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is priced.
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Our paper differs in important ways from other research on restatements and
equity risk. Bardos (2011) and Badertscher and Burks (2010) find that restating firms
experience an increase in Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity following restatement
announcements, suggesting an increase in information asymmetry. Palmrose et al. (2004)
document an increase in the dispersion of analyst forecasts following restatement
announcements. However, they find no evidence of change in the bid-ask spread
subsequent to restatements. Although both bid-ask spread and the change in analyst
forecasts are associated with firm’s equity risk, neither represents a good proxy for risk
facing the long-term investor (Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Callahan et al. 1997). Wilson
(2008) analyzes changes in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) subsequent to the
restatement relative to ERC estimated five quarters before restatement announcement and
find that informational content of ERCs decreases only temporarily for two to three
quarters following the restatement announcement. However, as shown by Bardos et al.
(2011), ERCs prior to restatement announcement are a function of accounting mistakes
and therefore are not a reliable benchmark. Moreover, since several studies show that
analysts are slow to adjust their recommendations following restatements and other major
announcements (Griffin 2003; Kasznik 2004), Wilson’s earnings response coefficients
are calculated using potentially biased analyst forecasts.
Hribar and Jenkins (2004) estimate the impact of restatements on the firm’s cost
of equity using an implied cost of capital technique. They estimate the change in the cost
of capital one, three, and five months after the restatement and find that the cost of capital
increases following a restatement. The authors conclude that their evidence is consistent
with accounting restatements increasing investors’ required rates of return. However,
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application of implied cost of capital methodology to an event study such as restatements
makes the results particularly sensitive to biases in analyst forecasts, casting doubts on
the robustness of Hribar and Jenkins’s (2004) results. In the discussion of this paper,
Kasznik (2004) points out that the well-documented analyst under-reaction to adverse
earnings information may bias cost of capital estimates upward.
Kravet and Shevlin (2010) examine changes in the loadings on the information
risk factor before and after restatement announcements, which is based on how well
working capital accruals map into cash flows. They do so by including the information
risk factor as an additional term in the Fama and French (1993) model and find an
increase in the factor loadings on the discretionary information risk factor after the
restatement announcement. They also find a statistically insignificant decrease in beta
following restatement. There are several potential issues with their methodology. First, it
assumes that information risk is an additional risk factor, relying on theoretical model of
Easley and O’Hara (2004). However, more recent theoretical work finds that information
risk manifests itself in higher market beta rather than an additional factor (Hughes et al.
2007; Lambert et al. 2007; and Christensen et al. 2010). Moreover, for restating firms
they calculate the information risk factor prior to the restatement announcement using
figures that contain material accounting mistakes. Therefore, the difference in loadings
can potentially be attributed to mistakes in financial reports before restatement rather than
changes in pricing.
Furthermore, the methodology in Kravet and Shevlin (2010) and Hribar and
Jenkins’s (2004) does not allow for testing the prediction of Christensen et al. (2010) that
most of the change in information risk is concentrated at the announcement. Our

8

methodology estimates daily changes in beta, thus making it possible to estimate the
effect of the restatement announcement on the firm’s risk along with the evolution of
changes in the risk measures. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study
daily changes in firm risk and its association with information quality. Moreover, no prior
study has examined changes in idiosyncratic risk around restatements.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews in detail related
literature. Section 3 discusses our methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Results and
their interpretation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Related literature
Early theoretical models in accounting literature which specifically model the
relation between firm’s disclosure and the cost of capital analyzed a single-firm setting.2
However, the single-firm setting does not allow differentiation between systematic and
idiosyncratic risks since. In a recent study, Easley and O’Hara (2004) develop a
multiasset rational expectations asset pricing model, in which private information
increases the uninformed investor’s risk. They show that the mix between public and
private information impacts the cost of capital, as investors demand higher returns for
holding stocks containing larger amounts of private information. Investors require higher
premiums because private information increases the risk to uninformed investors since
informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio weights to incorporate new
information. Easley and O’Hara’s (2004) model implies that information asymmetry
generates a new form of systematic risk which is reflected in the risk premium. Thus,
they establish an indirect link between information and the cost of capital, namely better
2

See Verrecchia (2001) for literature review.
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quality of financial information reduces both information asymmetry and adverse
selection, which in turn lowers the cost of capital. However, their model assumes that
future values of risky stocks are not correlated (they are independently normally
distributed) and that investors are exogenously endowed with a limited set of securities.
Therefore, the model does not account for the effects of diversification.
Using a framework similar to that of Easley and O’Hara (2004), Hughes et al.
(2007) examine the relation between asymmetric information and the cost of capital
utilizing a noisy rational expectations model with two classes of investors, informed and
uninformed. In contrast to Easley and O’Hara (2004), they find that information from
private signals about idiosyncratic shocks is idiosyncratic and therefore has no effect on
the cost of capital. Their analysis differs from Easley and O’Hara’s (2004) in two ways.
First, they examine large economies, which allow for full diversification, while Easley
and O’Hara (2004) consider only finite economies. Second, they assume factor structure
as in Ross’s (1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory for both private signals and asset payoffs.
Lambert et al. (2007) analyze the relation between information risk and the cost of
capital using a CAPM type model with only public information and multiple securities,
the payoffs of which are correlated. They show that better quality firm-specific
disclosures reduces the cost of capital. Furthermore, this information effect is nondiversifiable since it affects the firm’s assessed covariances with other firms’ cash flows
and is present for all covariance terms. Based on these results, Lambert et al. (2007)
conclude that the best way to empirically analyze the link between information quality
and the cost of capital is via the beta factor.3 The findings of Lambert et al. (2007) that
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Their results do not provide support for an information risk factor over and above beta as suggested by
Easley and O’Hara (2004), unless that factor captures measurement error in beta.
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information risk is priced contradicts Hughes et al. (2007) claim that information risk is
fully diversifiable. Lambert et al. (2007) attribute the difference in result to a different
definition of the cost of capital, and state that when they translate results from Hughes et
al. (2007) into their definition of the cost of capital, they continue to find that information
risk is priced.4
In a recent study, Christensen et al. (2010) argue that the decrease in the cost of
capital after release of more precise information (as shown by Lambert et al. 2007) is
temporal and is entirely offset by the increase in the cost of capital prior to the release of
information. As a result, information risk has no effect on the ex ante cost of capital
covering the full span of the firm. Christensen et al. (2010) analyze a two period model
with one risky asset and both public and private information. However, they argue that
results hold in a more general setting with multiple risky assets and multiple periods. A
limiting assumption of Christensen et al. (2010) is that the information system has no
impact on capital investment and other production choices.5 Moreover, the results of the
model might not hold if investors have non-time-additive preferences.
Empirical tests of the impact of disclosure quality on risk critically depend on the
measure of disclosure quality and the measure of the cost of capital (Leuz and Wysocki
2015). A large body of literature examines cross-sectional association between disclosure
quality and the cost of capital. To measure information quality, several studies used CFA
Institute (formerly Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR))
scores composed by financial analysts that evaluate firm disclosure based on annual,
4

Hughes et al. (2007) define the cost of capital as the difference between beginning-of-period price and
end-of-period expected cash flows, while Lambert et al. (2007) define cost of capital as the expected rate of
return on the firm’s stock.
5
Lambert et al. (2007) do not explicitly model firm’s production decision and capital raising needs, but do
consider effect of disclosure on real decision (Indjejikian 2007).
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quarterly and other published information, along with communications with analysts
(Botosan and Plumlee 2002). However, AIMR scores suffer from several biases and were
available only for large U.S. firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Other studies construct an
index of disclosure in firm’s annual reports (Botosan 1997; Botosan 2006; Hail 2003; and
Francis et al. 2008). The problem with such indices is that they focus exclusively on
annual reports and ignore other forms of disclosure, capturing the existence of certain
disclosures rather than disclosure quality (Leuz and Wysocki 2015). These papers find
negative association between quality of disclosure and the cost of capital for at least a
sub-sample of firms. Richardson (2000) finds that there is a systematic relationship
between the magnitude of information asymmetry and the level of earnings management.
Recent studies use earnings quality measures, mainly based on models of accruals
quality ala Dechow and Dichev (2002), to proxy for information quality (Francis et al.
2004, 2005; Francis et al. 2008; Verdi 2006; Ogneva 2007; Ecker et al. 2006) and find
that better quality financial information reduces the cost of capital. Another concern with
aforementioned studies is the limitations of the measure of the cost of capital and the
shortcomings of the research design. Several studies use implied cost of capital
methodology to estimate the cost of capital, which measures the cost of capital as a
discount rate that makes the stock price equal to the discounted present value of future
cash flows.6 The primary drawback to this methodology is that it relies on analyst
forecasts of future performance. Easton and Sommers (2007) illustrate that upward biases
occur in implied cost of capital due to overoptimistic analyst forecasts. Hughes et al.
(2009) demonstrate that implied cost of capital differs from expected return, by a function

6

Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Francis et al. (2004, 2005), Francis et al. (2008), among
others, use implied cost of capital methodology.
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encompassing volatilities of, as well as correlation between, expected returns and cash
flows, growth in cash flows, and leverage. They express the concern that empirical
relations documented using implied cost of capital are attributable to this difference.
Moreover, Core et al. (2008) show that contemporaneous regressions of asset returns on
factor returns, which include accruals quality as a separate factor such as those in Francis
et al. (2004, 2005), are not well specified and that the relation between returns and
accrual quality disappears when proper asset pricing tests are employed. Core et al.
(2008) further show that daily hedge portfolio evidence in Ecker et al. (2006) and Nichols
(2006) appears to be misspecified.
Several other studies analyze the association between disclosure and the cost of
capital in the event-study setting rather than using cross-sectional framework. Schrand
and Verrecchia (2005) and Leone et al. (2007) find that better pre-IPO disclosure is
associated with lower under-pricing. Graham et al. (2008) find that the cost of debt
increases following a restatement announcement. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find an
increase in the implied cost of capital technique following restatements. Ye and Yu
(2018) examine whether restatements affect trading volume reactions to subsequent
earnings announcements. They find that restatements increase the degree of differential
event-period information, leading to more divergent interpretation of earnings
announcements subsequent to restatements.
Gleason et al., (2008) show an information transfer effect for non-restatement
firms. They find that accounting restatements that result in negative market reaction at the
announcement of the restatement cause stock price declines among non- restating firms in
the same industry, particularly those with high industry-adjusted accruals. This result is
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concentrated in revenue restatements by large firms, as well as for peer firms with high
earnings and high accruals when restating firm a peer firm use the same external auditor.
Xu et al. (2006) also examine intra industry effects of accounting restatements and find
no significant change in risk of the rival firms, suggesting that a firm’s earnings
restatement does not have a long-lasting impact on inventors’ confidence in the earnings
quality of the rival firms. Other studies examine timeliness of financial information
disclosures in the context of the efficient market hypothesis (Huang et al. 2017; and Yen
and Lee 2008). Yu and Chen (2017) argue that in deciding how much customer
information to disclose, managers face a tradeoff between the benefits of reducing
information asymmetry and the losses of revealing proprietary information. Tuo et al.
(2019) find that disclosure strategies of individual firms are significantly influenced by
their peer firms’ disclosure behaviors.
In summary, the empirical literature on the cross-sectional association of the
quality of financial information and the cost of capital is inconclusive and is sensitive to
alternative research design. More importantly, almost all of the aforementioned studies
fail to investigate the dynamic nature of the risk components, i.e., systematic and
idiosyncratic risk. Most of the disagreements in the empirical findings are related to the
behavior of systematic risk surrounding the particular event, but no attention is being paid
to idiosyncratic risk.
Restatements provide a unique opportunity to study the dynamic nature of the risk
components of restating firms because ex post one can identify a period during which
publically available financial information contained material mistakes (we call this
window the error period). Moreover, ex post one can identify the size and the nature of
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the mistakes. Therefore, we can use observable characteristics of the quality of financial
reporting rather than noisy proxies. Furthermore, we can use the firm as its own control
and consequently avoid omitted variable and endogeneity problems that arise when one
attempts to control for the determinants of disclosure quality. A number of papers show
that accruals measure of disclosure quality has many shortcomings (Banker et al. 2019).

3 Measures of equity risk: the dynamic market model
Bardos at el. (2011) show that investors are misled by material mistakes in
financial statements for most of the error period, which starts with the first restated report
and ends with the restatement announcement.7 Since investors are misled by material
mistakes, restatements of financials signal to the market poor quality of previously
reported financial information as well as raise concern regarding the quality of future
reports. The theoretical model of Lambert et al. (2007) implies a permanent increase in
beta for restating firms. If information risk is priced, then we should observe an increase
in beta at restatement announcement that persists after restatement. In light of the
findings of Bardos et al. (2011), who find that the marginal investor anticipates
restatements three months prior to its announcement it is possible that beta increases
before restatement due to its anticipation. Our research design also allows us to test
whether changes in the components of risk around disclosure are temporal since we are
able to estimate daily changes in both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Restatements
present a particularly good setting to test for such changes because they are unscheduled
events and therefore the pre-announcement period does not overlap with post-

7

Note that the average length of the error period in their study is about two years.
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announcement period from prior announcement of the same type, which would be the
case for earnings announcements or other regularly scheduled disclosure events.
To examine the dynamic nature of systematic (beta) and idiosyncratic risk, we
use a bivariate Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model with time-varying betas, variances
and covariances.8 We estimate the model over the period of three years before and three
years after the restatement announcement.9 The advantage of this model is that we obtain
daily estimates of beta, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk10. The dynamic bivariate
EGARCH market model can be described by the following set of equations:
Ri,t = ci + βi,t Rm,t + εi,t

(1)

Rm,t = cm + εm,t

(2)

where Ri,t and Rm,t are the daily returns on the individual security and the market portfolio
respectively; βi,t is the time-varying security beta; ci,t and cm,t are constants and; εi,t and εm,t
are innovations or, error terms for the individual security and the market respectively.
The elements of the variance/covariance matrix of the two error terms follow a
bivariate EGARCH model described by the following set of equations:
σ2[εi,t] = exp{αi,0 + αi,1(│zi,t-1│ - E│zi,t-1│ + δizi,t-1) + φi ln(σ2[εi,t-1]) }

(3)

σ2[εm,t]= exp{αm,0 + αm,1(│zm,t-1│ - E│zm,t-1│+ δmzm,t-1)+ φm ln(σ2[εm,t-1]}

(4)

σi,m,t = ρi,m (σ2[εi,t] σ2[εm,t])1/2

(5)

where, ln(.) are natural logarithms, zi,t = εi,t/ σ[εi,t] and zm,t = εm,t/ σ[εm,t] are normalized
innovations; σi,m,t and ρi,m are the conditional covariance and the conditional correlation;

8

A number of papers discusses the sensitivity of the results to beta estimation (Gong et al. 2006).
Not all firms have return data for the entire time period. We require firms to have at least six months of
data prior to mistake so that firm performance before material mistakes in financial statements can serve as
a benchmark.
10
To our knowledge this is the first study to examine the behavior of idiosyncratic risk during restatements.
9
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and αi,0, αi,1, δi, φi, αm,0, αm,1, δm , φm are fixed parameters to be estimated. The univariate
EGARCH model was introduced by Nelson (1991) as a way of modeling time-varying
volatilities for speculative assets. Compared to standard GARCH models it has several
advantages. First, it does not require non-negativity constraints for the parameters since it
imposes the non-negativity constraint in the variance directly. Second, it can accommodate
asymmetric responses of the variance to positive and negative innovations, a phenomenon
frequently observed in the stock markets. Third, it allows for oscillatory behavior of the
variance. Negative values for δi and δm would imply that negative returns are followed by
higher volatility than positive returns of an equal size. The degree of volatility persistence is
captured by parameters φi and φm.11 The beta of the individual security is given by
βi,t = (σi,m,t/ σ2[εm,t]).

(6)

Equation (1) implies that σ [Ri,t] =( β2i,t σ2[εm,t]+ σ2[εi,t])1/2 . Furthermore, the total
standard deviation can be decomposed into its systematic part and its idiosyncratic part, in
terms of βi,t , as follows:
σ [Ri,t]=βi,t σ[εm,t] + {σ[Ri,t] – βi,t σ[εm,t]},

(7)

where βi,t σ[εm,t] and {σ[Ri,t] – βi,t σ[εm,t]}, represents systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk
respectively.12
We estimate the fixed parameters of the model using Quasi Maximum Likelihood
and maximizing the sample log-likelihood function of the form:
L(Θ)= - T log(2π) – (1/2) Σt (logHt + EtH-1E'),

(8)

where, T is the number of observations, Θ is the parameter vector to be estimated, Et=[εi,t
εm,t] is the 1x2 vector of innovations at time t, Ht = Cov(Et  It-1), is the time-varying
11
12

See Koutmos and Booth (1995) for further details on the multivariate EGARCH model.
We will be referring to beta and systematic risk interchangeably.

17

covariance matrix. The diagonal elements of Ht are given by (3) and (4) and the cross
diagonal elements are given by (5).

We obtain consistent standard errors following

Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Because of nonlinearities in the log-likelihood function,
numerical maximization techniques are used to obtain parameter estimates. The particular
algorithm used is based on Berndt et al. (1974). In estimating the model, we pair each
company with the market portfolio and we obtain estimates of the fixed parameters as well
as time-series estimates of the time-varying parameters βi,t, σ2[εi,t], σ2[εm,t] and σi,m,t-1.

4 Data
This study analyzes a sample of restatements announced between January 1, 1997
and June 30, 2002. Since our objective is to examine changes in risk around serious
material reporting violations, we focus on the period prior to enactment of SarbanesOxley act (SOX) because following SOX, restatements became more technical (Burks
(2011)). In this paper we use the sample of restatements used by Bardos et al. (2011). The
advantage of the sample is that it is hand collected and carefully constructed focusing on
mistakes, rather than changes in accounting, and thus avoids potential problems as those
discussed in Karpoff at el (2017).
We focus only on annual restatements, which involve restatement of at least one
annual report. For such restatements, financial statements with material mistakes have
been audited, while for restatements of only quarterly reports mistakes have been
uncovered before the audit.13 This suggests that annual restatements represent cases of
poorer quality of financial information. Moreover, Bardos et al. (2011) find that investors

13

Annual restatements involve amendments of potentially all quarterly reports, not just the forth quarter.
The key difference between annual restatements is that they are made after the audit of financial statements.
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are misled by annual restatements and are not misled by restatements of only quarterly
reports.
Restatement dates and restatement characteristics are hand collected from the
Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases are
researched using key words “restatement,” “restat,” “revis,” “adjust,” “error” and
“responding to guidance from the SEC” for the period January 1, 1997 through June 30,
2002. We identified 923 restatement announcements between 1997 and 2002 and crosschecked these announcements with the sample released by Government Accountability
Office (GAO, 2002). Following Bardos et al. (2011), we excluded 130 restatements
which were caused by the adoption of new accounting rules or changes in accounting
methods since our focus is on the effect of quality of financial information on risk, rather
than the impact of changes in accounting rules. This mitigates the main issue identified
by Dechow et al. (2010) with using restatements as a proxy for earnings quality. We lose
remaining observations due to missing data in either CRSP or COMPUSTAT, or due to
missing information about the restatement itself. The final sample includes 536
restatements from 496 firms. The sample includes 330 annual restatements, of which 247
are income decreasing. To arrive at our final sample of 143 restatements made by 137
firms, we retained firms with at least six months of returns prior to mistake through
restatement announcement,14 with non-missing data on size the year before restatement
announcement. We require firms to have at least six months of data prior to mistake so
that firm performance before material mistakes in financial statements can serve as a
benchmark.

14

For an average firm in our sample the distance from mistake to restatement is two years.
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample. The mean market
capitalization for our sample is 3.3 billion, with the median of 248 million. Average value
of total assets is higher and equals 4.2 billion. The average leverage equals 20%.
Restating firms amend 2.3 years, on average. Consistent with prior studies, we find that
restatements are associated with a negative abnormal stock price decline of -9% as
measured by CAR01. Abnormal return (CAR01) is defined as a market model cumulative
abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to a restatement announcement.
Market model parameters are estimated over a 250 day period starting on day -46 relative
to restatement using value weighted market index.15 The mean (median) Change in NI
equals -43% (-2%) of total assets, with the mean of only 2%. Change in NI is the
difference between restated Net Income and originally reported Net Income divided by
total assets reported in the year preceding restatement announcement. If more than one
period is restated, Net Income for all restated periods is added up. For only five percent
of restatements net income crosses the loss threshold.
We separately analyze restatements with and without irregularity. For a sample of
firms without irregularity, restatement announcement will signal only poor quality
financial information. The irregularity sub-sample will reflect the effect of both poor
information quality and fraud on firms’ risk. Following Palmrose et al. (2004) and
Hennes et al. (2008) we define Irregularity as a dummy that equals one if the company
announced fraud or an irregularity as a reason for restatement or if restating firm was
subject to Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) as a result of a
restatement. About 36% of restatements in our sample are due to irregularity. Forty three
15

We use standard methodology employed in other studies, rather than EGARCH, to calculate CAR01 so
that we can compare our sample to that used in prior studies. CAR01 is reported only for descriptive
purposes and is not central to our study.
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percent of restatements involve core accounts, such as revenue and cost. We also separate
restatements that provide full information about corrected statements and the ones they
do not provide all of the details (No detail). 57% of restatements provide no details at
restatement announcement. We also separate between restatements initiated by different
parties, such as SEC, Company and Auditor. The majority of restatements are initiated by
the company (49%), with 32% initiated by the SEC and 11% by the auditor.

5 Results
5.1. Changes in measures of risk around restatement announcement
We first depict trends in systematic, idiosyncratic and total risk for the full sample
250 trading days before and after restatement announcement (Figure 1 and Table 2). We
estimate a series of bivariate EGARCH models to obtain estimates of the risk
components specific to each firm, and then average the firm-specific estimates across
firms in order to create the Figures. Recall that systematic risk is measured by beta,
which is given in equation (6), and idiosyncratic and total risk is given in equation (7).
Beta experiences a slight upward trend in the year leading to the announcement. A
significant spike occurs immediately after the announcement, followed by a gradual
decline. Idiosyncratic risk increases gradually in the year leading to the announcement,
displaying a sharp increase in the week prior, followed by a sharp increase immediately
after the announcement and a gradual decline to what appears to be a sustained higher
level of idiosyncratic risk. A similar pattern is observed for total risk. We find that
idiosyncratic risk has a higher persistence after restatement announcement while beta
reverts faster to a slightly higher level than before restatement.
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Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for trends observed in Figure 1. It confirms
that the spike in all measures of risk is economically significant: beta spikes 43% relative
to base period, i.e., a six months window ending on day 127 prior to restatement
announcement. Idiosyncratic risk increases 46% at restatement announcement. All
measures of risk remain high one month and one year after restatement. Beta is 23%
higher one month after restatement (window (+6; +26)) than during the base period and is
8% higher one year following a restatement (window (+27; +250)). Idiosyncratic risk
remains higher than beta relative to the base level – 37% higher one month after
restatement and 21% higher one year after restatement.
In Table 3, we test statistical significance of trends depicted in Figure 1 and Table
2. Using a panel regression approach, we regress measures of risk on restatement
announcement and post-restatement time dummies. To account for residual dependence
created by firm and time effects we cluster standard errors by restatement. Petersen
(2009) shows that only clustered standard errors are unbiased and correctly account for
the dependence in the presence of fixed firm effects. Clustering solely by restatement is
sufficient when there are only few clusters on time dimension, as is the case in our
study.16
To decide which time dummies to include in Table 3 panel regression, we
examine trends in all risk measures for 250 days before and after the restatement. Figure
1 reveals that there is an upward trend in all measures of risk prior to restatement
announcement; therefore, we include a dummy for six months before restatement
announcement for all measures of risk. For beta we include a dummy for 120 trading

16

We analyze restatements announced during a 5 year window. Petersen (2009) considers 10 year clusters
to be small.
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days before restatement (-120; -1) only (with the coefficient labeled b1). For total and
idiosyncratic risk we observe a spike about one week before restatement. Therefore, we
include time dummies for 120 trading days before restatement, starting on day -6 (-126; 6), and for a five trading day window prior to restatement (-5; -1) for total and
idiosyncratic risk. Coefficients on these dummies are labeled b1 and b1’, respectively.
To estimate the effect of restatement announcement on risk, we include a time dummy
for window (0; +5) with the estimated coefficient of b2. Figure 1 shows that the increase
in total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk, as well as increase in beta persist after
restatement announcement and is particularly pronounced during the month following a
restatement. To test whether increase in measures of risk persists both in the short and the
long run, we include a dummy for the month following a restatement (window (+6; +26))
and a dummy for the rest of the year following a restatement (+27; +250). We label
coefficients on these dummies b3 and b4, respectively. The intercept in Tables 3-6
reflects the baseline of days (-250; 119).
Table 3 shows that trends depicted in Figure 1 are statistically significant. Beta
spikes at restatement announcement and remains at elevated levels one month following
restatement. Note that the coefficient on b2 (restatement announcement window of (0;
+5)) is much higher than all other coefficients, confirming a substantial spike. The
coefficient b3 (window (+6; +26)) is about half the size of b2 and is also highly
significant, suggesting that beta remains elevated one month after restatement
announcement. Unlike in the case of total and idiosyncratic risks, which begin increasing
about one year before restatement, firm’s beta starts increasing only one week before
restatement (b1 is not significant for beta regression). Similarly, coefficient on dummy
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(+6; +250) is not significant for beta, while it is significant for other measures of risk.
The results suggest that restatements cause a significant spike in beta but that the effect of
restatement on beta is temporary.
Table 3 confirms that idiosyncratic and total risks begin increasing before
restatement (particularly one week before), peek at restatement announcement and
remain at elevated levels one year following restatement as suggested by significant
coefficients on all time dummies. The increase is the greatest at the restatement
announcement and one month after restatement. For total risk, all coefficients on time
dummies are different from each other except for b1’ and b4 – coefficients on a dummy
for one week period before restatement (-5, -1) and a dummy for post-restatement period
(+27; +250), respectively. This suggests that total risk increases about half a year prior to
restatement, increases further one week prior to restatement, spikes at restatement
announcement, declines after restatement announcement for about one month and
remains at the level it has been one week prior to restatement for the rest of the postrestatement period. For idiosyncratic risk we find very similar results, except that the
coefficient for b1 and b4 are not different from each other, suggesting that idiosyncratic
risk after restatement in window (+27; +250) is of the same level as six months before
restatement during window (-120; -6).
Overall, our findings suggest that systematic risk is experiencing a temporary
increase due to restatement. Specifically, beta increases 43% at restatement
announcement relative to base period and remains at elevated levels one month after
restatement. However, it returns to the pre-restatement level thereafter. This result is in
agreement with Christensen et al. (2010). We also find that idiosyncratic risk experiences
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a 46% increase at restatement announcement and remains 21% higher than the base level
one year after restatement, suggesting a long-term increase in idiosyncratic risk.

5.2 Results by characteristic of restatement and restating firms
5.2.1 Irregularity versus no-irregularity restatements
In this section we study changes in risk for different sub-samples of restatements.
First, we examine whether changes in risk differ for sub-samples with and without
irregularity. Restatements due to irregularity reveal both poorer quality of financial
information and greater uncertainty regarding firms’ management and its integrity.
Therefore, a sub-sample of restatements with irregularity will capture both the effect of
poor quality information and the effect of fraud on risk. Restatements that are not due to
fraud are of particular interest since in this sample the effect of poor quality of financial
statements on risk is isolated. We define restatements due to irregularity using an
approach along the lines of Palmrose et al. (2004) and Hennes et al. (2008) as
restatements subject to SEC enforcement actions (AAER) and as restatements that
disclose irregularity or fraud as the reason for restatement. As shown in Table 1, Panel C,
36% of our sample of restatements involves irregularity.
Figure 2 and Table 4 show that, as expected, the change in all measures of risk is
greater at restatement announcement and one month following restatement due to
irregularity. For the irregularity sub-sample, beta spikes from 0.89 the day before
restatement to its highest level of 1.69 two days after restatements (an increase of 90%)
and gradually declines to pre-restatement level (as suggested by insignificant coefficient
on b4 (+27; +250) window dummy). Although an increase in beta at restatement

25

announcement of no-irregularity sub-sample is not as pronounced, it is also statistically
significant. The beta increases 18% from 0.76 on day -1 to its highest point of 0.89 on
day +2 for no-irregularity sub-sample. For both sub-samples beta returns to prerestatement level.
Idiosyncratic risk increases six months before restatement, increases further one
week before restatement, increases 59.1% for irregularly and 16.7% for no-irregularity
sub-samples from day -1 to day +2, respectively (Figure 2c). All increases are statistically
significant as shown in Table 4, Panel B (coefficients on b1, b1’ and b2 are statistically
significant and different from each other). Idiosyncratic risk remains at elevated level one
month after restatement for both sub-samples. Interestingly, the increase in idiosyncratic
risk is significant only for irregularity sub-sample: idiosyncratic risk one year after
restatement remains at the same elevated level it reaches one week prior to restatement
(b1’=b4). For no-irregularity sub-sample, idiosyncratic risk returns to pre-restatement
level one month after restatement since coefficient on b4 is not significant. Increases in
total risk are significant for all sub-periods for both sub-samples.
Overall our results suggest that poor quality financial information, even in the
absence of irregularity, increases firm beta and idiosyncratic risk at restatement
announcement and one month after restatement. Restatements that involve irregularity
cause temporary increase in beta and a long-term increase in idiosyncratic risk. Noirregularity restatements cause only temporary increase in both beta and idiosyncratic
risk.
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5.2.2 Core versus non-core restatements
We also separately analyze restatements due to corrections of core and non-core
accounts. We define core restatements as those involving revenue, cost of sales or
operating expense accounts for on-going operations to control for the seriousness of the
restatement.

In our sample, restating firms also amend non-core accounts such as

securities-related items (e.g., accounting for derivatives, warrants, stock options and
convertible securities), in-process research and development (IPR&D), reclassifications
and related party transactions. Previous research finds that more persistent operating
income is associated with stronger market reactions (Kormendi and Lipe 1987). Several
studies have also shown that the market reacts more strongly to surprises in on-going
operating income than to one-time special items (Elliott and Hanna 1996; Strong and
Meyer 1987). Therefore, restatement of non-core items can have smaller effect on firm
risk because ax ante market expects non-core accounts to be recorded with less precision.
Recall that forty three percent of our sample of restatements affect core accounts.
Figure 3 and Table 5 show the analysis of the trends in risk for these sub-samples.
Interestingly, beta increases more for non-core than for core sub-sample: the increase
from day -1 to day +2 equals 57.5% and 17.9%, respectively. Similarly, idiosyncratic and
total risks increase more for non-core sub-sample. Idiosyncratic risk increases 31.7% for
non-core and 16.7% for core sub-samples from day -1 to day +2.

Table 5, Panel A

shows that increase in beta at restatement announcement and one month after restatement
are statistically significant for both sub-samples. Trends in idiosyncratic and total risk are
similar for core and non-core sub-samples and the full sample except for the fact that for
both sub-samples coefficient b4 on window (+27; +250) is not significant in idiosyncratic
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risk regression, suggesting that it returns to base level after restatement. As a result, total
risk increases after restatement only for core sample. Overall, this analysis suggests that
non-core restatements increase risk more than core restatements. This result is
particularly interesting in light of the findings of Palmrose et al. (2004) that restatements
of core accounts are not associated with abnormal returns at restatement announcement,
controlling for other determinants of the returns.

5.2.3 Large versus small firms
Next, we analyze whether the change in risk around restatement announcement is
different for large and small firms. Large firms have been shown to have lower
information asymmetry due to greater analyst and media coverage (Frankel and Li 2004;
Healy and Palepu 2001). Moreover, large and small firms have different composition of
risk, with large firms having less total risk. Several studies show that new information
released by large firms has spill over affects on other firms in the industry and that larger
firms tend to announce earnings earlier than smaller firms (Ramnath 2002; Han and Wild
1990). Moreover, large firms tend to implement long-term performance plans that reduce
the level of earnings management (Richardson and Waegelein 2002). Large firms also
end to have more institutional investors and it has been shown that institutional investors’
presence acts as a monitor on target firms’ use of real earnings manipulation activities
(Sakaki et al. 2017). Therefore, we expect that firm specific information released by
larger firms at restatement announcement is likely to affect covariance with other firms in
the industry and as a result increase systematic risk more for such firms.
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We find results consistent with this prediction (see Figure 4 and Table 6). Large
(small) firms are defined as above (below) mean logarithm of market capitalization
measured at fiscal year end before restatement announcement. Beta increases more for
large firms than for small firms (Figure 4a and Figure 4b), while increase in idiosyncratic
risk is of similar magnitude for large and small firms (Figure 4c). Consistent with results
for the full sample, beta increases only at restatement announcement and remains high
one month after restatement for both small and large firms. Both total risk and
idiosyncratic risk increase six months before restatement announcement for small and
large firms. Overall, consistent with asset pricing literature we find that small firms have
more total risk and more idiosyncratic risk, but have less systematic risk than large firms.

5.2.4 Restatements initiated by SEC, Auditor and Company
Next, we analyze whether the change in risk around restatement announcement
depends on who initiated the restatement. We distinguish between restatements initiated
by SEC, auditor and company. We expect that if restatement is initiated by the SEC and
auditor there will be more uncertainty in the market and the risk measures will increase
more. Palmrose et al. (2004) find a more negative market reaction, respectively,
associated with restatements initiated by the auditor. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that
restatements initiated by auditor have the greatest increase in the and higher implied cost
of capital following restatement announcement. Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find that
restatement initiator affects the change in the pricing of discretionary information risk.
Figure 5 shows that firms whose restatements are initiated by the SEC have
higher beta but lower idiosyncratic risk the year prior to restatement. Their total risk is
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also lower during this period. These firms see a spike in all measures of risk at the
announcement of restatement. Beta increases from 0.94 the day before restatement
announcement to 1.17 on the second day after restatement announcement representing a
24% increase. Unsystematic risk increases 29%. Table 7 confirms that the increase in all
measures of risk for restatements initiated by SEC are higher at restatement
announcement. We find that the coefficient on b3 is statistically significant in Table 7
Panel A, but the coefficient on b4 is not statistically significant. This suggests that the
beta returns to the base level one months after restatement announcement. At the same
time, we find that the coefficient on b4 is statistically significant in Table 7 Panel B,
suggesting that idiosyncratic risk increases for a year after restatement announcement.
We also find that coefficient b1 is less than b4, suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is above
both the base level and the level six month before restatement. This trend is seen in
Figure 5b. Table 7 Panel C shows that total risk increases at restatement announcement
and remains elevated one year after restatement announcement for firms initiated by the
SEC.
Firms whose restatement is initiated by the Auditor have lower beta one year
leading up to the restatement (Figure 5). At the same time, idiosyncratic risk for these
firms is above those whose restatements are initiated by the SEC and similar to those
whose restatements are initiated by the company. Total risk appears similar in this period
for firms initiated by the SEC, auditor and the firm. Restatements initiated by the auditor
see an increase in all risk measures: beta increases 54% (from day -1 to day +2),
idiosyncratic risk increases 55% (from day -1 to day +4), and total risk increases 54%
(from day -1 to day +4). As shown in Table 7 this increase in announcement period risk is
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statistically significant. We find that this increase in risk persists for one month following
restatement announcement but that all measures of risk return to base levels after that
(coefficient b4 is insignificant for Auditor regressions in all panels in Table 7 and is not
different than b1). We see a pronounced downward trend in idiosyncratic risk for auditor
initiated restatements following restatement announcement.
Lastly, we analyze the changes in measures of risk for restatements originated by
the company. We find that the beta for these companies is higher than the beta of
companies whose restatement were originated by the auditor, but lower than the beta of
the companies whose restatements were originated by the SEC. Those firms experienced
the largest increase in beta at restatement announcement: the beta increased 79% from
day -1 to day 3 relative to restatement announcement. The increase in idiosyncratic risk
was more modest in this period, it was equal to 33%.
Just like SEC and auditor initiated restatements, company initiated restatements
see increase in beta only at announcement and one month after restatement. Beta returns
to base level after that (as suggested by significant coefficients b2 and b3, and
insignificant coefficient b4 in Table 7 Panel A). Idiosyncratic risk increases 6 months
before restatement (b1 is positive and significant in Table 7 Panel B), which is not true
for SEC and Auditor initiated restatements. We find that all levels of risk for company
initiated restatements returned to base level one month after restatement announcement
(coefficient b4 is not significant in Table 7 Panels A. B and C).
Overall, we find that SEC initiated restatements appear to have higher beta but
lower idiosyncratic risk leading up to restatements, and continue to have higher beta
following the restatement. All types of restatements (SEC, Auditor and Company)
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experience only temporary increase in all measures of risk, with company initiated
restatements having the largest increase in beta. For all types risk measures return to prerestatement level one month after restatement.

5.2.5 Frequency of Restatements
In this section we examine whether risk measures differ for companies that restate
more than once. A failure to solve accounting problems as evidenced by multiple
restatements is likely to increase the riskiness of the firm. Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find
that the number of times a firm restates affecting the change in the pricing of
discretionary information risk. Hence, we expect that the companies that restated more
than once would experience bigger changes in the measures of risk.
In our sample, only 5 companies restated their financial statements more than
once (one company restated 3 times, 4 restated 2 times). Figure 6 shows that companies
that restate more than once have more volatile betas (this could be a result of a smaller
sample size). For these firms all measures of risk increase at restatement announcement
and both beta and idiosyncratic risk remain elevated one year after the restatement. This
results are consistent with the prediction that multiple offenders have poor quality
financial statements and therefore have higher risk (Kravet and Shevlin (2010)). We do
not perform regression analysis for subsamples of restatements that restated multiple
times versus one time offenders because of the small sample size for multiple
restatements.
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5.3 Cross-sectional analysis of changes in risk at restatement announcement
To test whether the difference between changes in risk around restatement
announcement are statistically significant for different sub-samples discussed in section
5.2, we perform cross-sectional analysis (see Table 8). The dependent variable is the
mean of the risk measure for the specified period divided by the mean of the respective
risk measure during the base period. We analyze cross-sectional determinants in changes
in measures of risk during the same periods analyzed in Table 3: (-120; -1), (0; +5), (+6;
+26), (+27; +250). Numbers in parenthesis show days relative to restatement
announcement. We include the following variables in the regression: Irregularity, Core
and log (Market Cap).

Irregularity is a dummy that equals one if the company

announced fraud or an irregularity as a reason for restatement, or if the restating firm was
subject to AAER as a result of a restatement. Core is a dummy equal to one if a
restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or operating expense accounts for on-going
operations, and equals zero otherwise. Market cap is the market capitalization measured
at the year end prior to restatement.
In results not tabulated, we regress change in all measures of risk six months
before restatement announcement (window (-120; -1)) on explanatory variables. None of
these regressions are statistically significant, suggesting that risk six months before
restatement is of similar magnitude for all sub-samples. Panel A, Table 8 shows the
regression of changes in announcement period returns (window (0; +5)) relative to the
base period. The coefficient on log(Market Cap) is positive and significant in regression
for all measures of risk. Coefficient on irregularity dummy is positive and significant in
regressions on idiosyncratic and total risk but is insignificant in beta regression. This
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suggests that at restatement announcement beta increases by similar amount for
irregularity and no-irregularity, while idiosyncratic risk increases more for irregularity
sub-sample. The results are not affected if we estimate announcement period returns over
a shorter window: (0; +2).17 Panel B shows the analysis of changes in risk one month
after restatement relative to the base period. We find that beta increases more for
irregularity and core sub-samples, while idiosyncratic risk and total risk increase more for
irregularity sub-sample and larger firms. Panel C reports the analysis of changes in risk
during window (+27; +250) relative to the base period. For beta we find that the
coefficients on Core and Irregularity dummies are positive and significant. For
idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient on Core becomes insignificant (p value equals 0.1056).
In Panel C the coefficient on log(Market Cap) is insignificant in all regressions. In results
not shows we include dummies SEC, Auditor and Company in all models and find the
coefficients on these variables to be insignificant.
Overall, cross-sectional analysis reveals that beta increases more for large firms at
the restatement announcement, but not in the year following a restatement. In the year
following a restatement, beta increases more for irregularity and core restatements.
Idiosyncratic risk increases more for the irregularity sub-sample at restatement
announcement and after restatement. Large firms experience greater increase in
idiosyncratic risk at the restatement announcement and one month after restatement, but
not in the window (+27; +250).
5.4 Short-term return and idiosyncratic risk at restatement announcement
In this section we examine if idiosyncratic risk is priced. To do that we regress
announcement period abnormal returns on announcement period idiosyncratic risk. As
17

For all measures of risk and all sub-samples day +2 corresponds to the maximum value of risk measures.
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shown in Table 9, the coefficient on idiosyncratic risk is negative and statistically
significant at 1%, suggesting an inverse relationship between announcement period
abnormal returns and idiosyncratic risk. This negative association is consistent with the
volatility feedback hypothesis, whereby higher volatility (in this case idiosyncratic
volatility) leads to higher required rates of returns and therefore to lower stock prices
(e.g. Campbell and Hentschel 1992).
We also include a number of control variables in this regression. Irregularity is a
dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud or an irregularity as a reason for
restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER as a result of a restatement. Core is
a dummy that equals one if a restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or operating
expense accounts for on-going operations, and equals zero otherwise. Change in NI is the
difference between restated Net Income and originally reported Net Income divided by
total assets reported in the year preceding restatement announcement. If more than one
period is restated, Net Income for all restated periods is added up. NI crosses loss
threshold equals one if a restatement changes reported income into a loss and equals zero
otherwise. No details is a dummy that equals one if the restatement announcement did not
contain all the detail of the restatement. Number of years restated is the number of
restated annual reports. SEC, Company and Auditor are dummy variables that equal one
if the restatement is initiated by the SEC, company and auditor, respectively. Leverage is
the value of long-term debt divided by total assets, calculated at the year end prior to the
restatement announcement. Market cap and is measured at the year end prior to the
restatement announcement.
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We find that coefficient on Irregularity is negative and statistically significant
consistent with our prior findings. We also find that restatements that do not provide all
the details about the restatement have a more negative announcement period abnormal
return. Surprisingly, we find that the more periods the company restates, the higher its
announcement period abnormal return.

6 Conclusion
Our study extends prior literature by analyzing the dynamics of equity risk and its
idiosyncratic and systematic components of firms that restate financials. We contribute to
the literature by modeling the dynamic properties of both systematic and idiosyncratic
risk and by reexamining the association between poor quality financial information and
the cost of equity using different research design. We define poor quality financial
information as material mistakes in annual financial statements which require restatement
of previously reported financial statements. Undoubtedly, if a firm has material mistakes
in its financial reports, the quality of its financial disclosure is poor. We examine changes
in systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures around restatements using a bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances.
We find that idiosyncratic risk increases as early as six months prior to
restatement announcement, spikes at the restatement announcement, decreases relative to
announcement level and remains at elevated levels relative to pre-restatement period for
approximately one year following restatement. The increase in beta is temporary – it
experiences a significant increase at restatement announcement but returns to prerestatement level one month following restatement. All measures of risk increase more at
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restatement announcement or following a restatement for restatements involving
irregularity or core accounts and for larger firms. Changes in risk differ for restatements
originated by SEC, auditor and company as well as for multiple restatements. Overall,
our results show that there is significant temporary increase in both risk components with
idiosyncratic risk remaining higher over longer periods. Interestingly, we find that there
is a negative and significant relation between announcement period return and
idiosyncratic risk. The practical implication is that there is a reduction in stock prices,
presumably due to a higher required rate of return. The persistence of idiosyncratic
volatility following restatements has important implications for the pricing of derivative
securities. Rising and persistent volatility will tend to raise the prices of call and put
options written on the stocks in question.
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Figure 1: Changes in risk around restatement announcement – full sample
This figure presents the changes in firm’s mean beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement
of financial statement restatements. Horizontal axis shows trading days relative to restatement
announcement, with restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated
using bivariate Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Arrow
with label “Restatement” points to the observation corresponding to the day of restatement announcement.
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Figure 2: Changes in risk around restatement announcement – irregularity versus
no irregularity
This figure presents the changes in firm’s beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement of
financial statement restatements for sub-sample with and without irregularity. Horizontal axis shows
trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement corresponding to
day=0. Irregularity restatements are those subject to SEC enforcement actions (AAER) or those that
disclose an accounting irregularity or fraud as the reason for restatement. All measures of risk are estimated
using bivariate Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Arrow
with label “Restatement” points to the observation corresponding to the day of restatement announcement.
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Figure 3: Changes in risk around restatement announcement – core versus non-core
This figure presents the changes in firm’s beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement of
financial statement restatements for core and non-core restatement sub-samples. Horizontal axis shows
trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement corresponding to
day=0. Core restatements are defined as those that involve revenue, cost of sales or operating expense
accounts for on-going operations. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential GARCH
model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Arrow with label “Restatement” points to the
observation corresponding to the day of restatement announcement.
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Figure 4: Changes in risk around restatement announcement – large versus small
firms
This figure presents the changes in firm’s beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement of
financial statement restatements for large and small firms. Horizontal axis shows trading days relative to
restatement announcement, with restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. Large (small) firms
are defined as above (below) mean logarithm of market capitalization measured at fiscal year end before
restatement announcement. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential GARCH model
with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Arrow with label “Restatement” points to the
observation corresponding to the day of restatement announcement.
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Figure 5: Changes in risk around restatement announcement – restatement initiated
by SEC, Auditor and Company
This figure presents the changes in firm’s beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement of
financial statement restatements for restatement initiated by SEC, Auditor and Company. Horizontal axis
shows trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement corresponding to
day=0. SEC, Company and Auditor are dummy variables that equal one if the restatement is initiated by the
SEC, company and auditor, respectively. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential
GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Arrow with label “Restatement”
points to the observation corresponding to the day of restatement announcement.
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Figure 6: Changes in risk around restatement announcement – restatement
frequency
This figure presents the changes in firm’s beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement of
financial statement restatements based on the frequency of the restatement. Four companies restated
financial statements twice. One company restated financial statement three times. Horizontal axis shows
trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement corresponding to
day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential GARCH model with time-varying
betas, variances and covariances. Arrow with label “Restatement” points to the observation corresponding
to the day of restatement announcement.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of 143 income decreasing restatements of at least one annual
report announced between January 1997 and June 2002. Variables in Panels B and C are hand collected from
Lexis-Nexis, Edgar, and Securities and Exchange Commission website. Market cap and total assets are
measured at the year end prior to the restatement announcement. Leverage is the value of long-term debt divided
by total assets, calculated at the year end prior to the restatement announcement. Number of years restated is the
number of restated annual reports. CAR announcement is a market model cumulative abnormal return for days
zero and plus one relative to a restatement announcement. Change in NI is the difference between restated Net
Income and originally reported Net Income divided by total assets reported in the year preceding restatement
announcement. If more than one period is restated, Net Income for all restated periods is added up. NI crosses
loss threshold equals one if a restatement changes reported income into a loss and equals zero otherwise.
Irregularity is a dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud or an irregularity as a reason for
restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER as a result of a restatement. Core is a dummy that equals
one if a restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or operating expense accounts for on-going operations, and
equals zero otherwise. No details is a dummy that equals one if the restatement announcement did not contain
all the detail of the restatement. SEC, Company and Auditor are dummy variables that equal one if the
restatement is initiated by the SEC, company and auditor, respectively.
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Median
248.4
5.52
428.9
0.185

Upper
Quartile
1,622.2
7.39
2,063.3
0.317

Std
10,364.0
2.26
12,823.4
0.187

N
143
143
143
143

Panel B: Restatement characteristics - continuous variables
Lower
Variable
Mean
Quartile
Median
Number of years restated
2.29
1.75
2.00
CAR announcement
-0.09
-0.16
-0.04
Change in NI
-0.43
-0.06
-0.02

Upper
Quartile
3.00
0.01
0.00

Std
0.91
0.17
4.38

N
143
139
140

Variable
Market cap (in millions)
Log (Market cap)
Total assets (in millions)
Leverage

Mean
3,314.5
5.75
4,188.7
0.204

Lower
Quartile
53.2
3.97
93.9
0.023

Panel C: Restatement characteristics - binary variables
Variable
Yes
as a %
NI crosses loss threshold
7
4.90%
Irregularity
51
35.70%
Core
62
43.40%
No details
82
57.34%
SEC
45
31.47%
Company
70
48.95%
Auditor
16
11.19%

No
136
92
81
61
98
73
127

as a %
95.10%
64.30%
56.60%
42.66%
68.53%
51.05%
88.81%
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of changes in risk around restatement announcement
This table shows changes in beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk around announcement of financial
statement restatements. Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement,
with restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances.
Panel A: Beta

Before restatement: (-250; -121) – base
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)

Mean
0.7272
0.7397
1.0410
0.8977
0.7845

% change
relative to base
1.7%
43.1%
23.4%
7.9%

Median
0.6382
0.6184
0.8278
0.7198
0.7140

% change relative
to base
-3.1%
29.7%
12.8%
11.9%

N
143
143
140
136
133

Panel B: Idiosyncratic risk

Before restatement: (-250; -121) – base
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)

Mean
0.0356
0.0380
0.0521
0.0486
0.0432

% change
relative to base
6.7%
46.4%
36.5%
21.3%

Median
0.0339
0.0350
0.0388
0.0383
0.0363

% change relative
to base
3.3%
14.6%
13.0%
7.3%

N
143
143
140
136
133

Panel C: Total risk

Before restatement: (-250; -121) – base
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)

Mean
0.0433
0.0462
0.0636
0.0590
0.0525

% change
relative to base
6.7%
47.1%
36.5%
21.3%

Median
0.0397
0.0447
0.0495
0.0483
0.0472

% change relative
to base
12.6%
24.8%
21.8%
19.0%

N
143
143
140
136
133
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Table 3: Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement announcement
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by
restatement. Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with
restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Dependent variable
Coeff.
Intercept
0.727
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
b1
0.013
Before restatement: (-120; -6)
b1
Before restatement: (-5; -1)
b1’
Restatement announcement: (0; +5) b2
0.328
After restatement: (+6; +26)
b3
0.173
After restatement: (+27; +250)
b4
0.049

Beta
Idiosyncratic risk
Total risk
T-stat
Coeff. T-stat
Coeff. T-stat
15.96*** 0.036 23.64*** 0.043 27.43***
0.64
0.002 2.95***
0.003 3.05***
0.007 3.01***
0.008 3.09***
3.12***
0.016 5.69***
0.020 5.43***
3.51***
0.012 4.49***
0.015 4.59***
1.55
0.004 2.40**
0.005 3.10***

T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b1’
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b1’=b2
b1’=b3
b1’=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

-2.28**
-5.29***
-4.06***
-1.10
-3.92***
-1.88*
1.52
2.16**
4.72***
3.40***

-3.21***
-4.06***
-1.20

2.09**
2.68***
2.58***
65,320
0.006
3.54***

65,320
0.015
6.67***

-2.28**
-5.14***
-4.25***
-1.67*
-3.94***
-2.28**
1.10
2.42**
4.25***
3.16***
65,320
0.018
6.30***
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Table 4: Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement announcement –
irregularity versus no irregularity
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by
restatement. Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with
restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Irregularity restatements
are those subject to SEC enforcement actions (AAER) or those that disclose an accounting irregularity or
fraud as the reason for restatement. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Beta
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

Beta

b1
b2
b3
b4

Irregularity
Coeff
T-stat
0.756
9.84***
0.016
0.38
0.692
2.40**
0.365
2.87***
0.060
0.95

-2.50**
-3.60***
-0.72
1.60
2.23**
2.50**
23,479
0.049
3.64***

No Irregularity
Coeff
T-stat
0.711
12.51***
0.011
0.53
0.135
3.45***
0.071
2.43**
0.042
1.23

-3.72***
-2.17**
-0.97
2.22**
2.10**
0.93
41,841
0.007
4.64***
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Table 4 (continued): Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement
announcement – irregularity versus no irregularity
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by restatement.
Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement
corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential GARCH model with timevarying betas, variances and covariances. Irregularity restatements are those subject to SEC enforcement actions
(AAER) or those that disclose an accounting irregularity or fraud as the reason for restatement. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel B: Idiosyncratic and total risk
Dependent variable
Sub-sample

Idiosyncratic risk
Irregularity
No Irregularity
Coeff T-stat
Coeff T-stat
Intercept
0.031 15.10*** 0.038 19.09***
Before restatement: (-120; -6)
b1 0.002 2.40**
0.002 2.30**
Before restatement: (-5; -1)
b1' 0.007 2.22**
0.008 2.30**
Restatement announcement: (0; +5) b2 0.025 4.18*** 0.011 4.04***
After restatement: (+6; +26)
b3 0.021 3.38*** 0.007 3.26***
After restatement: (+27; +250)
b4 0.007 2.84*** 0.002 1.10
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b1'
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b1'=b2
b1'=b3
b1'=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

-1.66*
-4.12***
-3.27***
-2.07**
-3.66***
-3.36***
-0.16
0.94
3.48***
2.63***
23,479
0.042
3.75***

-1.76*
-3.42***
-2.47**
-0.07
-1.78*
0.24
1.73*
2.21**
3.21***
2.14**
41,841
0.006
4.16***

Total risk
Irregularity
No Irregularity
Coeff T-stat
Coeff T-stat
0.039 17.10*** 0.045 22.05***
0.003 2.33**
0.002 2.40**
0.008 2.32**
0.008 2.31**
0.034 3.88*** 0.013 4.25***
0.027 3.46*** 0.008 3.52***
0.009 2.99*** 0.004 1.73*

-1.72*
-3.84***
-3.42***
-2.09**
-3.44***
-3.34***
-0.31
1.26
3.12***
2.62***
23,479
0.049
3.64***

-1.71*
-3.62***
-2.70***
-0.60
-2.13**
0.04
1.36
2.35**
3.02***
1.81*
41,841
0.007
4.64***
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Table 5: Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement announcement –
core versus non-core
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by
restatement. Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with
restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Core restatements are
defined as those that involve revenue, cost of sales or operating expense accounts for on-going operations. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Beta
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

Beta

b1
b2
b3
b4

Coeff
0.71
0.01
0.13
0.07
0.04

Core
T-stat
12.51***
0.53
3.45***
2.43**
1.23

-3.72***
-2.17**
-0.97
2.22**
2.10**
0.93
41,841
0.002
3.66***

Coeff
0.79
0.00
0.28
0.10
0.02

Non-Core
T-stat
11.77***
0.03
1.90*
1.93*
0.47

-1.93*
-2.12*
-0.55
1.50
1.84*
1.97**
37,862
0.003
1.34
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Table 5 (continued): Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement
announcement – core versus non-core
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by restatement.
Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement
corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential GARCH model with timevarying betas, variances and covariances. Core restatements are defined as those that involve revenue, cost of sales or
operating expense accounts for on-going operations. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
Panel B: Idiosyncratic and total risk
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -6)
Before restatement: (-5; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b1'
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b1'=b2
b1'=b3
b1'=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

b1
b1'
b2
b3
b4

Idiosyncratic risk
Core
Non-Core
Coeff T-stat
Coeff T-stat
0.038 19.09*** 0.034 16.17***
0.002 2.3**
0.002 2.75***
0.008 2.30**
0.005 2.09**
0.011 4.04*** 0.012 4.09***
0.007 3.26*** 0.010 2.79***
0.002 1.10
0.002 1.07

-1.76*
-3.42***
-2.47**
-0.07
-1.78*
0.24
1.73*
2.21**
3.21***
2.14**
41,841
0.006
4.16***

-1.31
-3.57***
-2.25**
0.23
-3.24***
-2.10**
1.43
1.01
3.89***
2.48**
37,862
0.009
4.32***

Total risk
Core
Non-Core
Coeff T-stat Coeff
T-stat
0.045 22.05*** 0.042 18.72***
0.002 2.40**
0.003 2.87***
0.008 2.31**
0.006 2.10**
0.013 4.25*** 0.015 4.04***
0.008 3.52*** 0.012 3.06***
0.004 1.73*
0.003 1.56

-1.71*
-3.62***
-2.70***
-0.60
-2.13**
0.04
1.36
2.35**
3.02***
1.81*
41,841
0.020
4.90***

-1.26
-3.48***
-2.45**
-0.22
-3.15***
-2.32**
1.06
1.31
3.71***
2.55***
37,862
0.002
3.66***

55

Table 6: Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement announcement –
large versus small firms
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by
restatement. Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with
restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. Large (small) firms are
defined as above (below) mean logarithm of market capitalization measured at fiscal year end before
restatement announcement. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Beta
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

Beta

b1
b2
b3
b4

Large firms
Coeff
T-stat
0.971
12.62***
0.026
0.64
0.513
2.34**
0.205
2.15**
0.030
0.51

-2.50**
-0.07
1.99**
2.24**
1.89*
-2.39**
30,225
0.008
1.72

Coeff
0.530
0.002
0.148
0.122
0.037

Small firms
T-stat
12.29***
0.11
3.97***
3.18***
1.25

-3.25***
-1.25
1.17
3.08***
2.52***
-4.19***
35,095
0.005
4.43***
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Table 6 (continued): Regression analysis of changes in risk around restatement announcement
– large versus small firms
Panel B: Idiosyncratic and total risk
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -6)
Before restatement: (-5; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b1'
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b1'=b2
b1'=b3
b1'=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

b1
b1'
b2
b3
b4

Idiosyncratic risk
Large firms
Small firms
Coeff T-stat
Coeff T-stat
0.024 17.53*** 0.045 22.91***
0.002 2.67***
0.002 2.22**
0.005 2.05**
0.009 2.39**
0.016 3.51***
0.018 4.86***
0.012 2.64***
0.014 4.39***
0.005 2.73***
0.005 1.92*

-1.47
-3.37***
-2.38**
-1.95*
-2.91***
-2.21**
0.12
1.27
2.65***
1.70*
30,225
0.026
3.02**

-1.83*
-4.36***
-3.99***
-0.86
-3.09***
-1.15
1.35
1.75*
4.02***
3.28***
35,095
0.015
5.69***

Total risk
Large firms
Small firms
Coeff
T-stat
Coeff
T-stat
0.034 18.22*** 0.051 24.31***
0.003 2.70*** 0.003 2.16**
0.006 2.18**
0.010 2.36**
0.022 3.35*** 0.020 4.91***
0.015 2.75*** 0.015 4.49***
0.007 2.96*** 0.006 2.25**

-1.47
-3.21***
-2.51***
-1.94*
-2.82***
-2.22**
-0.09
1.67*
2.46**
1.68*
30,225
0.018
4.10***

-1.81*
-4.45***
-4.15***
-1.19
-3.24***
-1.4
1.07
1.75*
3.90***
3.13***
35,095
0.013
4.40***
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Table 7: Changes in risk around restatement announcement - SEC, Auditor and
Company
This table shows OLS regression of measures of risk on time dummies, with standard errors clusters by
restatement. Numbers in parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with
restatement announcement corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate
Exponential GARCH model with time-varying betas, variances and covariances. SEC, Company and
Auditor are dummy variables that equal one if the restatement is initiated by the SEC, company and
auditor, respectively.*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Beta
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

SEC

b1
b2
b3
b4

Coeff

T-stat

0.853
-0.002
0.229
0.153
0.086

10.78***
-0.06
3.12***
2.46**
1.48

-3.26***
-3.02***
-1.78*
1.61
1.83*
1.23
21,395
0.007
3.78***

Beta
Auditor
Coeff
T-stat
0.562
0.039
0.240
0.191
0.075

6.25***
1.23
2.26**
2.55**
1.38

-1.85*
-1.72
-0.52
0.61
1.3
1.47
7,045
0.017
3.05**

Company
Coeff
T-stat
0.696
0.019
0.449
0.198
0.004

9.72***
0.55
2.08**
2.12**
0.10

-2.12**
-2.47**
0.33
1.65
2.08**
2.10**
31,126
0.008
1.64
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Table 7 (continued): Changes in risk around restatement announcement - SEC, Auditor
and Company
Panel B: Idiosyncratic risk
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4

SEC
Coeff
T-stat
b1
b2
b3
b4

0.032
0.002
0.011
0.009
0.007

13.66***
1.63
3.30***
3.02***
3.08***

-3.04***
-2.82***
-2.27**
0.52
0.95
0.63

Idiosyncratic risk
Auditor
Company
Coeff
T-stat
Coeff
T-stat
0.037
0.004
0.022
0.015
0.000

6.43***
1.59
3.09***
3.02***
-0.13

-2.75**
-2.24**
1.10
1.51
2.86**
3.58***

0.038
0.002
0.020
0.014
0.002

17.17***
1.97**
3.93***
2.72***
0.72

-3.79***
-2.52**
0.15
1.85*
4.24***
2.79***

21,395
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

0.025
4.34***

7,045
0.019
3.23**

31,126
0.015
4.46***
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Table 7 (continued): Changes in risk around restatement announcement - SEC, Auditor
and Company
Panel C: Total risk
Dependent variable
Sub-sample
Intercept
Before restatement: (-120; -1)
Restatement announcement: (0; +5)
After restatement: (+6; +26)
After restatement: (+27; +250)
T-test of equivalence of coefficients:
b1=b2
b1=b3
b1=b4
b2=b3
b2=b4
b3=b4

SEC
Coeff
T-stat
b1
b2
b3
b4

0.041
0.002
0.013
0.011
0.009

16.13***
1.60
3.50***
3.22***
3.34***

-3.18***
-2.92***
-2.50**
0.82
0.95
0.43

Total Risk
Auditor
Coeff
T-stat
0.043
0.005
0.024
0.017
0.001

7.58***
1.59
3.07***
3.21***
0.33

-2.73**
-2.46**
0.77
1.34
2.67**
3.49***

Company
Coeff
T-stat
0.046
0.003
0.026
0.017
0.003

19.18***
2.07**
3.70***
2.82***
1.08

-3.62***
-2.68***
-0..06
2.05**
3.66***
2.64***

21,395
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

0.032
4.71***

7,045
0.020
3.20**

31,126
0.019
3.56***
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Table 8: Cross-sectional analysis of changes in risk measures at restatement
announcement
This table shows cross-sectional analysis of changes in risk measures for various windows relative to the
base period. Base period measures of risk are calculated for window (-250; -121). Numbers in
parenthesis show trading days relative to restatement announcement, with restatement announcement
corresponding to day=0. All measures of risk are estimated using bivariate Exponential GARCH model
with time-varying betas, variances and covariances as average announcement measures divided by
average base period measures. Irregularity is a dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud
or an irregularity as a reason for restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER as a result of a
restatement. Core is a dummy that equals one if a restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or
operating expense accounts for on-going operations, and equals zero otherwise. Market cap is the
market capitalization measured at the year end prior to restatement. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Announcement period risk measures (window (0; +5))
Dependent variable
Beta
Idiosyncratic risk
Coeff
T-stat
Coeff
T-stat
Intercept
0.717
2.49**
0.454
1.23
Irregularity
0.296
1.48
0.522
2.05**
Core
0.225
1.18
0.373
1.53
Log (Market cap)
0.094
2.14**
0.136
2.43**
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

140
0.048
3.34**

140
0.081
5.09***

Panel B: Post-restatement risk measures (window (+6; +26))
Dependent variable
Beta
Idiosyncratic risk
Coeff
T-stat
Coeff
T-stat
Intercept
0.980
5.32***
0.513
1.56
Irregularity
0.222
1.71*
0.518
2.23**
Core
0.213
1.75*
0.303
1.39
Log (Market cap)
0.028
0.98
0.110
2.18**
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

136
0.035
2.63**

136
0.082
5.02***

Panel C: Post-restatement risk measures (window (+27; +250))
Dependent variable
Beta
Idiosyncratic risk
Coeff
T-stat
Coeff
T-stat
Intercept
0.940
6.07***
0.906
4.47***
Irregularity
0.185
1.74*
0.306
2.20**
Core
0.214
2.12**
0.216
1.63
Log (Market cap)
0.010
0.44
0.034
1.09
N
Adjusted R-square
F value

133
0.038
2.74**

133
0.050
3.33**

Total risk
Coeff
T-stat
0.566
1.68*
0.485
2.08**
0.340
1.52
0.117
2.28**
140
0.077
4.85***

Total risk
Coeff
T-stat
0.628
2.15**
0.483
2.35**
0.282
1.46
0.089
1.99**
136
0.810
4.96***

Total risk
Coeff
T-stat
0.946
5.06***
0.279
2.18**
0.213
1.75*
0.026
0.93
133
0.049
3.25**
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Table 9: Short-term abnormal returns and idiosyncratic risk at restatement
announcement
This table shows the results of the regression of CAR announcement for a sample of 136 income decreasing
restatements of at least one annual report announced between January 1997 and June 2002. CAR
announcement is a market model cumulative abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to a
restatement announcement. Idiosyncratic risk is as measured by EGARCH model at restatement
announcement. Irregularity is a dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud or an irregularity
as a reason for restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER as a result of a restatement. Core is a
dummy that equals one if a restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or operating expense accounts for
on-going operations, and equals zero otherwise. Change in NI is the difference between restated Net
Income and originally reported Net Income divided by total assets reported in the year preceding
restatement announcement. If more than one period is restated, Net Income for all restated periods is added
up. NI crosses loss threshold equals one if a restatement changes reported income into a loss and equals
zero otherwise. No details is a dummy that equals one if the restatement announcement did not contain all
the detail of the restatement. Number of years restated is the number of restated annual reports. SEC,
Company and Auditor are dummy variables that equal one if the restatement is initiated by the SEC,
company and auditor, respectively. Leverage is the value of long-term debt divided by total assets,
calculated at the year end prior to the restatement announcement. Market cap and is measured at the year
end prior to the restatement announcement.

Log (Market cap)

Coeff
-0.011
-0.030
-0.081
-0.018
0.001
-0.047
-0.082
0.036
-0.045
-0.008
0.002
-0.021
0.001

N
Adjusted R-square
F value

136
0.1543
3.05***

Intercept
Idiosyncratic risk
Irregularity
Core
Change in NI
NI crosses loss threshold

No details
Number of years restated

SEC
Company
Auditor
Leverage

T stat
-0.17
-3.18***
-2.70***
-0.66
0.28
-0.65
-3.05***
2.34**
-0.87
-0.17
0.03
-0.29
0.13
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